Common of Piscary by Linsey, Jay W.
Notre Dame Law Review




Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation




A Quarterly Law Review
VOL XIII MARCH, 1938 NO. 3
COMMON OF PISCARYQ UTSIDE of its value to the profession for the legal
questions discussed, this article will be of little inter-
est to the person who has never experienced the thrill from
the strike of a leaping trout or a fighting bass.
The right of the public to fish in waters of states such as
Michigan becomes an important business factor. Michigan's
second greatest industry is its tourist business. Other states,
such as Wisconsin, Minnesota and New York, hold out in-
ducements to tourists to visit their respective states. Mich-
igan especially advertises its lakes and streams and the fish-
ing opportunities therein provided.'
It will thus be observed that, independent of the recrea-
tional feature of the right of the public to fish in the lakes
and streams of these various states, this right has great po-
tential value as an inducement to tourist trade.
The law as to the right of fishery has back of it an ancient
history. Intimately connected with this subject is the law
1 Michigan for the year 1936 issued 478,795 resident fishing licenses and
115,292 nonresident fishing licenses. The American Automobile Association, Wash-
ington, D. C., conservatively estimates that $315,000,000 was left in the State of
Michigan in 1936 by automobile tourists; in Wisconsin $200,000,000; in Minnesota
$90,535,000; in Maine $100,000,000 and in New York $198,000,000.
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relating to navigable waters. A'treatise of great length
might be written discussing the various legal phases of this
interesting and important subject. In describing the differ-
ent kinds of fisheries the words "several," "exclusive," "com-
mon," and "free" are used. We are here, speaking generally,
interested only in the common of piscary or free right of
fishery in the public.
The right was a matter of controversy prior to the grant-
ing of the Magna Charta in the year 1215 by King John.
By that charter it was directed that rivers that were fenced
should be laid open and grants of exclusive fishery for the
future were prohibited.
Prior to the Magna Charta, the Angles and Saxons had
invaded and conquered England in the fifth and sixth cen-
turies. They were an energetic people, loving freedom, and
were excessively fond of outdoor sports, such as hunting and
fishing. These characteristics were found in the Norsemen
who occasionally made war upon the Anglo-Saxons and in
their raid left behind them a portion of their people who
mingled and became a part of the Britons.
Until the Normans invaded England such a thing as reg-
ulations concerning the right of fishery was unknown. The
streams, and the fish within their waters, were common
property and were free to be taken by the people generally.
The Normans strived for individual power and dominion.
The great barons demanded, and William and his successors
conceded to them, the right of private fishery. The king,
however, reserved the sea, the arms thereof and the rivers
entering therein, so far as the tide ebbed and flowed, be-
cause it was necessary to have access to the bays and rivers
for navigation purposes. This class of waters was called pub-
lic and the right of the public to fish therein was conceded
because they were in fact public waters.
There grew up in the early legal history of England a
series of distinctions of the right of fishery. These were di-
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vided into the "several right of fishery," the "free right of
fishery," and the "public" or "common right of fishery." The
public right of fishery was the common right to take fish
from the waters over which the king held dominion. Much
litigation arose in England over these rights and alleged vio-
lations.
Among the principles which were established it was held
that in a free fishery a man had a property in the fish before
they were caught; in a common of piscary or public fishery
and in a several fishery not until they were caught; that a
public river is a public highway, and this is its distinguishing
characteristic; that the right to common of fishery was vest-
ed in the people in all public rivers.2
In the early English history the public rivers were the
rivers which were used for navigation and extended to where
the tide ebbed and flowed.
In the early history of the United States, and particularly
in the Northwest Territory, the right of public fishery in the
streams and lakes was acquiesced in for many years, but
landed proprietors, in imitation of their Norman ancestors,
began to exclude the public from the streams running
through private lands, which gave rise to litigation especially
in the States of Michigan and Wisconsin.
The people of these states, since the adoption of their
constitution, acted upon the belief that the right of public
fishery existed in all of the streams of the state. They estab-
lished hatcheries for the propagation of fish wherewith the
streams might be stocked so that the supply would not be
exhausted. They have established a Department of Con-
servation for the purpose of guarding, controlling and pro-
tecting the fish in these streams. Hundreds of thousands of
dollars of the taxpayers' money have been expended to pro-
vide for public recreation and enjoyment in following this
2 2 BL. Comm. 39; COKE ON LITTLETON 122; HARGRAVE'S NOTES 181; LORD
HAx., DE JuRE MAras II.
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pastime. In these modern times not only are these resources
used for industrial enterprises, but with the congestion and
stress of city life, have become a necessity for rest and recre-
ation. These blessings which Nature has provided ought not
to be taken from the people generally except upon the most
compelling legal reasons.
The common right of fishery is substantially in every
case determined by ascertaining whether or not the stream
or lake in question is public or navigable water. In the de-
cisions a difference is sometimes made between public and
navigable waters. This, however, is a distinction without
any substantial difference.
In approaching the question of the rights of the public and
the riparian owner to the beneficial uses of our streams and
lakes, it is well to keep in mind the provisions of the Ordi-
nance of 1787 which was passed for the Government of the
United States northwest of the Ohio River, upon the cession
of this territory by Virginia to the United States. This Ordi-
nance provides:
"The navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence
and the carrying places between the same shall be common highways
and forever free as well to the inhabitants of the said territory as to the
citizens of the United States."
This Ordinance has been referred to time and again by the
courts in considering the rights of the public in navigable
waters in this territory.
It is important at this point to keep in mind what the
courts have said constitutes navigable waters. The Michigan
Supreme Court, in the early case of Moore v. Sanborne,s
laid down the following rule:
"Navigability extends to embrace all streams upon which, in their
natural state, there is capacity for valuable floatage, irrespective of the
fact of actual public use, or the extent of such use ... nor. . . can the
fact that a floatable stream has not been used by the public or has
3 2 Mich. 519, 524, 525 (1853).
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only been used by persons following a particular occupation, deprive
such stream of its public character."
Again, approving Brown v. Chadburn,' there cited:
"'The true test, therefore, to be applied in such cases is, whether
a stream is inherently and in its nature, capable of being used for the
purpose of commerce for the floating of vessels, boats, rafts or logs.'"
And again, navigation by boat
"is too narrow a rule upon which, in this country, to establish the
rights of the public, and as already intimated, such is not the rule in
any of the States. The servitude of the public interest depends rather
upon the purpose for which the public requires the use of its streams,
than upon any particular mode of use."
This is the rule generally followed in other states, as well as
in Michigan.'
The leading case upon the right of the public to fish in
such navigable streams as above described is Collins v.
Gerhardt.8
Originally, the courts held the title of navigable streams
to be in the state. For some reason, which is not clearly
4 31 Me. 9 (1849).
5 The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. (77 U. S.) 557, 19 L. Ed. 999 (1871); The Mon-
tello, 20 Wall. (87 U. S.) 430, 22 L. Ed. 391 (1874); United States v. Holt State
Bank, 270 U. S. 49, 46 S. Ct. 197, 70 L. Ed. 465 (1926); United States v. Utah,
283 U. S. 64, 51 S. Ct. 438, 75 L. Ed. 844 (1931); Toledo Liberal Shooting Co. v.
Erie Shooting Club, 90 Fed. 680 (C. C. A. 6th, 1898); Harrison v. Fite, 148 Fed.
781 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906); Gratz v. McKee, 270 Fed. 713 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920);
Moore v. Sanborne, 2 Mich. 520, 59 Am. Dec. 209 (1853); Lorman v. Benson, 8
Mich. 18, 17 Am. Dec. 435 (1860); Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 319 (1860); Thunder
Bay River Booming Co. v. Speechly, 31 Mich. 336, 18 Am. Rep. 184 (1875) ; Att'y
Gen'l v. Evart Booming Co., 34 Mich. 462 (1876); White River Log, etc., Co. v.
Nelson, 45 Mich. 578, 8 N. W. 587, 909 (1881); Buchanan v. Grand River, etc.,
Log Co., 48 Mich. 364, 12 N. W. 490 (1882); Burroughs v. Whitwam, 59 Mich.
279, 26 N. W. 491 (1886); Sterling v. Jackson, 69 Mich. 488, 37 N. W. 845, 13
Am. St. Rep. 405 (1888); City of Grand Rapids v. Powers, 89 Mich. 94, 50 N. W.
661, 14 L. R. A. 498, 28 Am. St. Rep. 276 (1891); Baldwin v. Erie Shooting Club,
127 Mich. 659, 87 N. W. 59 (1901); People v. Horling, 137 Mich. 406, 100 N. W.
691 (1904); Cole v. Dooley, 137 Mich. 419, 100 N. W. 561 (1904); Giddings v.
Rogalewski, 192 Mich. 319, 158 N. W. 951 (1916); Winans v. Willetts, 197 Mich.
512, 163 N. IV. 993 (1917); Putnam v. Kinney, 248 Mich. 410, 227 N. W. 741
(1929).
6 237 Mich. 38, 211 N. W. 115 (1926). See: Ne-Bo-Shone Ass'n v. Hograth,
81 Fed. (2d) 70 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936); Willow River Club v. Wade, 100 Wis. 86,
76 N. W. 273 (1898); Lincoln v. Davis, 53 Mich. 375, 19 N. W. 103 (1884);
Ainsworth v. Hunting and Fishing Club, 153 Mich. 185, 116 N. W. 992 (1908);
State v. Fishing and Shooting Club, 127 Mich. 580, 87 N. W. 117 (1901); People
v. Collison, 85 Mich. 105, 48 N. W. 292 (1891).
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stated, the Michigan court held that the title to subaqueous
soil was in the riparian owner.7
In order to meet the argument that the ownership of sub-
aqueous soil in the riparian owner carried with it all of the
beneficial uses of the stream possibly outside of the right to
navigate, the trust doctrine was adopted by the courts. The
trust theory and the right of the public to fish in navigable
waters are complementary, each stating the same rule, one
from the standpoint of the public right, the other from the
standpoint of the land owner's obligation.
Navigation is the paramount right in public navigable
waters. The common right of fishery can be said to occupy
a place side by side with navigation though sometimes
obliged to give way to the navigation rights, and sometimes
navigation rights having to give way to fishery rights.'
These are the dominant estates of the inhabitants over
the servient estates of the owners of the bed of these public
navigable waters. Fish in a state of freedom in navigable
waters are ferae naturae and the property of the people and
the state in whose waters they may be, not as a private
proprietor but in their sovereign capacity, as the representa-
tive and for the benefit of all people in common. No individ-
ual of the state can claim particular exclusive ownership
therein. In the exercise of the right of fishery the individual
citizen of the state may pursue and capture in such waters
over the submerged lands those fish inhabiting the same
without being a trespasser or wrongdoer, and he may do this
lawfully without the consent of the owner of the submerged
lands. Whether the trust theory of title to and ownership
of subaqueous land in public navigable waters ever had any
sound philosophical basis or not, it now exists. Possibly like
Topsy, it "just grew." At all events, it was so declared and
is the common-law doctrine today in the state of Michigan
7 Lorman v. Benson, 8 Mich. 18 (1860).
s wright v. Mulvaney, 78 Wis. 89, 46 N. W. 1045 (1890).
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and supports the public navigation and fishery rights in all
such waters. The trust theory was best expressed in the
language of Mr. Justice McDonald in Collins v. Gerhardt
as follows:
"The plaintiff, though owner of the soil, has no greater fishing rights
than any other citizen. Their rights are equal and correlative. So long
as water flows and fish swim in Pine River, the people may fish at their
pleasure in any part of the stream subject only to the restraints and
regulations imposed by the State. In this right they are protected by a
high, solemn and perpetual trust, which it is the duty of the State to
forever maintain. Of course, in exercising this right people cannot go
upon the uplands of riparian owners in order to gain access to the
water. If they do that they are guilty of trespass." 10
At this point it may be interesting to note the right of
fishery in wholly private lakes or ponds where there are sev-
eral riparian owners. The courts generally hold that where
a person is an owner of a portion of the riparian rights, either
he or his licensee has a right to fish in any portion of the
waters of such private lake or pond.'1
As a summary we conclude: (1) The public have a right
to fish in all public or navigable waters; (2) That a stream
is navigable when in its natural state it has the capacity to
float logs; (3) That floatability is not separable from navi-
gability as has been frequently argued in our courts; (4) The
trust doctrine has been applied where the courts have held
the title to subaqueous soil to be in riparian owners so that
the riparian owner holds the land as a servient estate sub-
ject to the right of the public to fish thereon; and (5) That
private lakes may be fished in any part thereof by any of the
riparian owners or their licensees.
9 Op. cit. supra note 6.
10 See: State v. Venice of America Land Co., 160 Mich. 680, 125 N. W. 770
(1910); Kavanaugh v. Rabior, 222 Mich. 68, 192 N. W. 623 (1923); Nedtweg v.
Wallace, 237 Mich. 14, 208 N. W. 51 (1926); Kavanaugh v. Baird, 241 Mich. 240,
217 N. W. 2 (1928); Hot Springs Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Revercomb, 106 Va.
176, 55 S. E. 580 (1906).
11 Beach v. Hayner, 207 Mich. 93, 173 N. W. 487 (1919); Douglas v. Berg-
land, 216 Mich. 380, 185 N. W. 819 (1921); Putnam v. Kinney, 248 Mich. 410,
227 N. W. 741 (1929).
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The courts should continue to follow the ruling in Collins
v. Gerhardt, to the end that the citizens of our country and
the thousands yet unborn may not be denied one of God's
greatest blessings.
Jay W. Linsey.
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Grand Rapids, Michigan.
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